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AUGUSTINE AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SINCERITY 
 
 
 
Suzanne Stern-Gillet 
 
 
 
I 
 
 
In 1958, the distinguished American literary critic Lionel Trilling published a book 
entitled Sincerity and Authenticity.  The volume was slim, yet it opened with an 
ambitious claim: 
I propose that at a certain point in its history the moral life of Europe 
added to itself a new element, the state or quality of the self which we call 
sincerity. (p. 2, my italics) 
 
In the first chapter of this book Trilling applied himself to the task of tracing ‘the 
origin and rise’ of this ‘new element’ and appears soon to have found an answer that fully 
satisfied him.  Sincerity, he writes, came into being in ‘the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries’.  Why then?  At that time, so he tells us, ‘something like a 
mutation in human nature took place.’ (pp 18-19, my italics)  What could such a 
mutation have been, which had so far gone generally unnoticed?  It was nothing less than 
the transformation of ‘men’ into ‘human beings’.  As for the cause of such a mutation, 
Trilling advises, we need look no further than ‘the dissolution of the feudal order and the 
diminished authority of the Church’.  Indeed, it was consequent upon these trends, so he 
claims, that ‘the idea of society… came into being.’ (p. 20)  Society, as then newly 
conceived, made possible the development of individualism.  The Reformation ensued.   
 
From such a simple, not to say simplistic, psycho-historical scheme, Trilling 
draws an explanation of the rise of confessional discourse and the consequent emergence 
of sincerity as a moral virtue.  Once Calvinist divines, he writes, had ‘liberated 
themselves from the sanctions of the corporate Church’ (p. 21), it became clear that ‘their 
 2
moral and intellectual authority’ could only be derived from their relation to the divine 
Word.’  This, he adds, was the point at which ‘plain speaking’ became ‘the order of the 
day’ (p. 22) and autobiography as a literary genre was born.  Such being the drift of 
Trilling’s historical narrative, it is hardly surprising that he should think of autobiography 
as a predominantly ‘Protestant’ genre (p. 23).  Admittedly, he is not unaware of the 
existence of examples of autobiography earlier than the sixteenth century, but he 
dismisses these as ‘sparse records of the events of religious experience’ (ibid.).  Indeed, 
he muses, how could these pre-Renaissance efforts have been anything other than 
rudimentary, since men had not yet turned into individuals and since no author of 
confessional writings, therefore, could have supposed that ‘he might be an object of 
interest to his fellow men’ (p. 24).   
 
But if I am not guilty of selective quotation - and I am not - then the question 
arises: how can Trilling possibly write as he does seemingly without taking any account 
of the existence of Augustine’s Confessions?  One obvious temptation must, I suppose, 
be thrust aside: namely to suggest that Trilling writes as he does because he had not 
actually read the Confessions.   But if, on grounds of charity, one excludes this extreme 
possibility and suggests instead that he may not, understandably enough, have considered 
that the Confessions meet the criteria of autobiography as a literary genre, one is faced 
with the difficult task of deciding which of the several criteria for the rise of sincerity 
Augustine’s Confessions have failed to meet.  Can we possibly suppose Trilling to imply 
that Augustine’s Confessions are to be included in those ‘sparse record of the events of 
religious experience’ which pre-date the sixteenth century?  No one even superficially 
acquainted with the Confessions could possibly come to such a conclusion.  Are we then 
to assume that, in Trilling’s view, Augustine wrote as he did without supposing that what 
he had to say about himself ‘might be an object of interest to his fellow men’?  Since 
Augustine, throughout the Confessions, addresses himself directly to God, yes, one might 
possibly attempt to argue that he was only indirectly concerned with the interest that his 
words might have for his fellow human beings.  But nowhere in his book does Trilling 
argue for such a thesis, nor do I think that it could seriously be maintained.  No, the 
conclusion has to be that Trilling’s whole account of the rise of sincerity is vitiated by his 
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failure to recognize Augustine’s masterpiece for what it is, his failure to take the measure 
of Augustine’s extraordinary innovation. 
 
Contra Trilling, I shall argue in this paper, the moral ideal of sincerity long pre-
dates the sixteenth century.  Contra Trilling, I shall here make bold to claim, the works of 
Augustine bear witness to the emergence, in the late antique age, of sincerity as a moral 
virtue.  If I had a taste for large and portentous claims, I might even say that it was 
Augustine who invented the virtue of sincerity. 
 
Before attempting to substantiate this contention, however, a working notion of 
sincerity is needed as well as some backing for the historical claim that its emergence as a 
virtue postdates the formulation of classical virtue theories.  In section II below, I engage 
in some preparatory spadework, conceptual and historical, before turning to Augustine’s 
writings in sections III to VII.    
 
 
II    
 
Sincerity is a complex notion.  Its everyday use is loose and untidy.  To draw a 
detailed and accurate map of the conceptual territory that it covers would be a more 
protracted task than the present framework allows.  The remarks that follow, therefore, 
are meant at providing no more than a sketch of the mental dispositions that sincerity is 
taken to characterize.    
 
Sincerity is a quality of the self – so much Trilling got right.  It designates a 
relationship of congruence or harmony between different parts, aspects or manifestations 
of the self.  These include not only thoughts, feelings and emotions but also the 
awareness - or lack of it - that the subject has of them, as well as the manner in which he 
expresses - or fails to express - them.  To gain an idea of the possibilities involved, 
consider the following example.  Your latest book has received rave reviews.  As your 
friend, I do feel pleasure.  But is my pleasure heartfelt?  And when I congratulate you on 
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your success, are my congratulations genuine?  The question arises because, as I read 
your reviews, I find myself dwelling on the weakness of some of the arguments that you 
present in that book.  I reflect on the dullness of your prose style.  I recall factual errors in 
your footnotes, and so on.  What’s more, all the while, I remember with renewed 
bitterness the lukewarm reviews that my own book has attracted.  Clearly, my 
congratulatory self is two-faced; my pleasure at your success is tinged with envy and 
resentment.  It is not ‘true’ pleasure.  I am not whole-hearted or, as Stuart Hampshire 
would put it, single-minded in the matter1.  Such double-mindedness cannot but cast 
doubt on my sincerity and the ‘genuineness’ of my pleasure.  If I am sufficiently self-
reflective and lucid in the matter, I may become aware of the fraudulent nature of my 
current feelings.  I may - but I need not.  Self-deception may intervene, anesthetize my 
resentment, and leave me conveniently unaware of my disingenuousness.   
 
To be sincere is both to tell the truth and to be true, for the two meanings of ‘true’ 
come together in sincerity.2  Commonly and roughly, truth is a property of those 
linguistic utterances - or, in Augustine’s terminology in the De magistro, signs - which 
correspond to some non-linguistic state of affairs.  ‘Linguistic utterances’, in this context, 
can be construed widely and extended also to include non-linguistic modes of 
communication such as facial expressions, laughter, and tears as well as the silent self-
narrative that each of us elaborates in the privacy of his own consciousness.  In this sense 
of ‘truth’, sincerity is the commendable disposition to match what we express to what we 
feel.  It is related to candour and can be contrasted with mendacity, deceitfulness and 
hypocrisy.  In this first sense, ‘true’ is a relational property.     
 
Less common but equally colloquial is the use of ‘true’ to designate the unalloyed 
nature or purity of a substance.  It is in this sense that we speak of ‘pure olive oil’ (i.e. 
unmixed with other oils), ‘pure bicarbonate of soda’ (i.e. unmixed with cream of tartar) 
or, by extension, ‘pure joy’ (i.e. unmixed with other emotions).  When it is applied to 
mental states, sincerity in this sense designates the commendable quality of one who is 
                                                 
1  Hampshire S. (1972: 232-256). 
2 The double meaning of ‘true’ in relation to its etymology is described in O’Donnell (1992, vol. I: VII n.3).    
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undivided in his feelings, or is of one mind with himself.  Sincerity, in this sense, is 
related to integrity and can be contrasted with self-deception and bad faith.  In this second 
sense, ‘true’ is a qualitative property. 
 
Sincerity, in both senses of the word, is the species of truth that pertains to the 
self.  The extent of my sincerity coincides with the limits of my own self.  ‘No man’, as 
Augustine said, ‘can look into another’s heart’3.  Just as I cannot confess your sins for 
you, I cannot look into your heart, feel your feelings, or think your thoughts.  I cannot, 
therefore, sincerely express them in your stead. 
 
The two senses of ‘sincere’ and ‘true’ are combined in the above example.  The 
congratulations that I extend to you and the broad smile that accompanies them are 
insincere in the first sense of the term since they do not correspond to what I think and 
feel.  They are straightforward lies.  But they are also likely to be insincere in the other 
sense of the word.  At least they would be so if I thought that my pleasure at your good 
reviews was authentic and entire.  My insincerity would then stem not so much from the 
split between what I feel and what I say, but rather from the conflict between my own 
emotions.  On the one hand I share in your happiness - or at least I want to or think that I 
do - yet, on the other hand, I am sour, rancorous, and envious.  What I want to be is 
discordant with what I truly am.  Or, in Kierkegaard’s more elegant expression, my heart 
is not pure; it does not will one thing only4.  Of this ambivalence, I may, but need not, be 
aware.  I may not care to examine myself too closely or I may be in plain bad faith.     
 
Sincerity is a dependent virtue.5  In this respect it is unlike first-order virtues, such 
as courage and generosity, which arise in direct response to the contingencies of daily 
                                                 
3 De sermone Domini in monte, II,25,82: non … potest cor alterius intueri.  See also Contra Mendacium, 
III.4: in hominis mente de qua latente, non potest judicare (‘one cannot judge of what is hidden in the 
human mind’, my transl.).   
4 Kierkegaard S. 1938, transl. D.V. Steere.  According to A.D.M. Walker (1978: 492), to whom the present 
section of this paper is indebted, this sense of sincerity is focal: ‘… at the kernel of the notion of sincerity 
lies the idea of purity, applied metaphorically to a man’s state of mind and its “contents”… our various uses 
of “sincere” and “sincerity” are related to each other in ways which mirror the connections between “pure”, 
“free from impurities” etc’.  See also Walker (1977: 91). 
5 The phrase ‘dependent virtues’ was coined by Michael Slote (1983: 61 sqq.) to designate those virtues 
which ‘only count as such when they are attended by certain other virtues’.  
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life, as they impinge upon the agent’s consciousness.  Rather than a direct response to 
outside circumstances, sincerity is a quality of an individual’s response to such 
circumstances.  Upon this response, it confers a seal of warranty certifying its 
genuineness or purity.6  Sincerity, therefore, often functions as an instrument of appraisal.  
But it is an instrument of appraisal of a highly specific kind since it can apply only to 
what is morally fine or, at least, sound.  This conceptual point is crucial.  In the same way 
as it is inappropriate to describe someone as a conscientious grifter or a diligent bank 
robber, it is conceptually improper to depict a person as sincerely envious or to say of a 
threat that it was uttered sincerely.  Only what is good can be sincere, such as gratitude, 
repentance or, in Augustine’s favorite example, love.  This is so even when sincerity is 
invoked as a mitigating factor, to account for the activities of the deluded crank or to 
mitigate the blame that we would otherwise wish to extend to the fanatical terrorist.  The 
fact that sincerity, in such cases, is perceived as a redeeming feature shows indirectly that 
its range of application cannot stray much beyond what is morally acceptable. 
 
 
III 
 
Sincerity is virtually absent from classical catalogues of the virtues.  Take Plato’s 
dialogues first, in which the ethical status of truth-telling is notoriously ambiguous.  In 
the early Hippias Minor Socrates is made to argue that it is morally better (cf. ἀμείνων 
ψυχή, 376 A sqq.) to be duplicitous than truthful.  He justifies this curious thesis by 
appeal to the craft model of virtue: while the truthful person is confined by the truth, his 
duplicitous counterpart, who can choose whether to tell the truth or to dissemble, has 
more power, hence greater wisdom.  In the Republic, the same Socrates tells Adeimantus 
that no one should ever be told lies (ψεύδεσθαι) about ‘the things that are’ (περὶ τὰ ὄντα, 
382 B 2) and that the practice of lying, if it were to become widespread, would destroy 
the city (389 D).  This does not prevent him from later defending the thesis that rulers 
may lie to their fellow citizens when to do so would benefit the city as a whole (414 C – 
415 C).   
                                                 
6 To my knowledge Walker (1978) is the first writer on the subject of sincerity to have stressed this point. 
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Aristotle, to whom we owe the first and still the best systematic classification of 
the virtues, appears to have found no need to include in it a general virtue of veracity.  In 
the midst of dealing with the cardinal virtues of courage, temperance, justice and wisdom, 
the father of virtue theory briefly considers a number of minor virtues which, as he points 
out, have no names (ἀνώνυμοι, N.E. 1107b30) but can be said generally to pertain to 
social life (τὸ συζῆν, ibid., 1127a18).  Truthfulness, viz. the quality of those who 
habitually tell the truth (ἀληθευόνται, ibid., 1127a19), is such a virtue.  In so far as it 
eases social life, truthfulness, in the Nicomachean Ethics, is presented as a rather 
superficial disposition of character, such as would be possessed by the Athenian ancestor 
of that old-fashioned British character, the ‘clubbable’ man.  Aristotle’s truthful man 
keeps to the mean, which suggests that he knows better than to tell the truth scrupulously 
and on all occasions.  His capacities of discernment enable him to do so at the right time 
to the right person and in the right manner.  Thus he is neither boastful nor unduly self-
deprecating.  As Aristotle specifies, ‘he inclines to tell less, rather than more, than the 
truth.  This appears to be in better taste, since exaggerations are burdensome’ (ibid., 
1127b7-9, my transl.).  Such an attitude to truth in social contexts is also characteristic of 
Aristotle’s paragon of virtue, the great-souled man:  this man, who has a just measure of 
himself, habitually tells the truth ‘… except when he is resorting to “irony” (δι’ εἰρωνείαν) 
in his dealings with the common sort of people.’ (ibid., 1124b30-31, my transl.)  
‘Resorting to irony’, which in this context means dissembling, is clearly not a practice 
that Aristotle regarded as morally wrong per se.  
 
Aristotle’s views on εἰρωνεία and veracity seem to have corresponded fairly 
closely to those held by his near, and not so near, contemporaries.  For Aristophanes, for 
instance, εἰρωνεία is straightforward lying7.  Plato, as we know, repeatedly ascribes 
εἰρωνεία to Socrates and, so it seems, salutes him for this quality.  Yet he also uses the 
                                                 
7 As mentioned by J. Rusten and I.C. Cunningham in their edition of Theophrastus.  They give as 
references Clouds 499, Wasps 174, and Birds 1211. 
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term to castigate the Sophists8.  Theophrastus, too, considers εἰρωνεία to be a profoundly 
ambiguous concept, as is evident from his thumbnail sketch of the dissembling man in 
the Characters.  ‘Dissembling (εἰρωνεία)’, he there writes, ‘would seem to be false 
denigration of one’s actions and words’9.  But this preliminary definition is undercut by 
the examples that Theophrastus proceeds to offer of this disposition of character.  Since 
these examples include praising openly someone whom one has maligned in secret as 
well as denying what one is actually doing at the very moment that one is doing it, it 
appears that Theophrastus includes under ‘dissembling’ not only urbane self-deprecation 
but also unadorned mendacity and plain hypocrisy.  His concluding warning to avoid 
dissemblers more than vipers comes, therefore, as no surprise.  What, by contrast, is 
intriguing is the reason that he gives in support of this warning, viz. that dissembling 
natures (ἤθη) are not ‘simple’ (μὴ ἁπλᾶ).  Clearly, in this context, ἁπλοῦς means simple 
or straightforward, as opposed to duplicitous.  The fact that at a later date, as proven by a 
number of inscriptions, ἁπλοῦς could also be predicated of pure metals, as opposed to 
alloys10 is interesting and may prove relevant to the analysis of Augustine’s later use of 
sincerus and mundus.  For the moment, let me just conclude that in classical Athens, 
dissembling could be considered laudable or blameworthy, depending on the 
circumstances.  
 
Before concluding this whistle-stop tour of salient attitudes to truth telling in the 
pagan ancient world, it is worth mentioning that, if Plotinus held views on the matter, he 
kept them to himself.  Nowhere in the Enneads is the subject broached, not even where 
one might have expected to find some mention of it, i.e. in the tractate on the virtues (I.2  
[19]).  Whatever sources Augustine may have drawn upon for his teachings on lying, 
therefore, it could not have been the Plotinian corpus.   
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Sophist 268 B – C.  If we take Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic to be representative of the 
Sophists as a group, the Sophists seem to have returned the compliment.  In 337 A 4 – 5 at any rate 
Thrasymachus castigates Socrates for his ‘usual irony’ (ἡ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία).  
9 Characters, 1.1, transl. J. Rusten and I.C. Cunningham (1993). 
10 See Liddell, Scott and Jones, s.v. III.c who refer to inscriptions from the 4th century A.D., i.e. roughly 
contemporary with Augustine.  It is interesting that this sense of ἁπλοῦς may be attested as early as Plato’s 
Phaedrus.  In 250 C 2 - 4, Socrates describes the vision enjoyed by discarnate souls as: ὁλόκληρα δὲ καὶ 
ἁπλᾶ καὶ ἀτρεμῆ καὶ εὐδαίμονα φάσματα μυούμενοί τε καὶ ἐποπτεύοντες ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ.  Hackforth 
(1952) translates: ‘whole and unblemished likewise, free from all alloy, steadfast and blissful were the 
spectacles on which we gazed in the moment of final revelation’. 
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V 
 
In contrast with ancient authors of the Classical period, Augustine adopted an 
uncompromising attitude to truth-telling.  In all circumstances, he consistently taught, 
lying is a sin, although he allowed that, as a sin, it admits of degrees.  In the De Mendacio 
(ca. 395), he carefully distinguishes lying from all other species of false and deceitful 
speech and posits that: ‘It is by the intention of the mind, not by the truth or falsity of the 
things themselves, that we must judge whether someone is lying or not lying.’ (III.3, my 
translation)11.  The fact that this definition now strikes us as obvious is a measure of its 
lasting influence upon subsequent thinking on the issue.  Augustine, however, was not 
content just to define lying.  He wanted to expose it in all its ugliness, as he thought of it.  
To that effect, he categorized and attacked the main arguments ever put forward in favour 
of certain kinds of lies.  As a result, the De Mendacio consists in a thorough exploration 
of the casuistry of mendacity.  Not even lies uttered in furtherance of an indisputably 
good moral or religious cause escaped Augustine’s censure.  To do evil in order that good 
may ensue can never be justified, he said again and again.   
 
The same inflexible anti-consequentialism characterizes the Contra Mendacium 
ad Consentium, written over twenty years later (422) and much narrower in scope and 
focus.  The occasion for the treatise was a suggestion that Augustine had received from a 
certain Consentius.  Consentius, a Spanish bishop, was troubled by the growing number 
of Priscillianists in his province.  At the time, some followers of Priscillianus, it seems, 
were masquerading as Catholics in order to be left undisturbed in the practice of their 
religion, which had already been pronounced heretical by three Councils12.  Fearful of the 
deleterious effects that the presence of Priscillianists in his flock might have, Consentius 
wrote to Augustine with the suggestion that some trusted Catholics be persuaded, in their 
                                                 
11 ‘Ex animi enim sui sententia, non ex rerum ipsarum veritate vel falsitate mentiens aut non mentiens 
judicandus est.’   
12 The Councils in question were those of Saragossa (380), Bordeaux (384) and Toledo (400).  On this 
tangled issue, see G. Combès’ notes on the Contra Mendacium (1948: 630-635).  Priscillianism was a 
syncretist heresy that included elements of Christianity, Gnosticism and Manicheanism.  
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turn, to infiltrate the ranks of Priscillianists with a view to convert them to the true 
religion.  As Consentius might have predicted, this suggestion elicited a blast from the 
Bishop of Hippo.  Not only would Consentius’ strategy be likely to prove ineffectual in 
converting those at whom the proposed lies were directed, so Augustine replied, but it 
would also be liable gravely to corrupt the liars themselves (III.6).  While the pseudo-
Catholic Priscillianists do utter the truth, they do so in order to deceive (V.9).  By 
contrast, Consentius’ proposed fifth columnists would be guilty of a double lie: denying 
their own faith, they would also be disseminating religious falsehoods, albeit temporarily 
and in pursuit of a laudable goal.  Lies should be exposed as such, Augustine argued, not 
countered by further lies, even if these are accompanied by an act of mental reservation 
(VI.14).  As for the view that a lie might be permissible if later compensated by some 
good, Augustine continued to have none of it; a lie, he said, is no less sinful for being 
inspired by the hope of bringing about a beneficial effect.         
 
While the topic of insincerity is not, as such, broached in the Contra Mendacium, 
there can be no doubt that it is covered by the comprehensive condemnation of lying 
contained in that treatise: ‘Those who declare thinking that which they do not think or 
deny thinking that which they do think, lie’, Augustine writes, before adding that those 
who do so in religious matters risk eternal damnation (III.5).  In the earlier and more 
philosophical De Mendacio, the evil said to be attendant upon all forms of mendacity had 
been more subtly characterized.  Lying, Augustine had then warned, corrupts the soul.13  
As can be seen, if Augustine denounced consequentialist justifications of lying, he was 
not above borrowing consequentialist tools to promote veracity.  But so grave, in his 
view, are the ills caused by lying that he may have decided to resort to any means at his 
disposal to discourage us from the practice.  For lying, as he thought, not only deceives 
others but also obfuscates our own rational and spiritual principle.  This latter view, I 
contend, accounts for the central place that sincerity occupies in his philosophy. 
 
 
V 
                                                 
13 De Mendacio, VII.10 (corrumpere) and XII.18-19 (obesse). 
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To justify this claim, I turn in the first place to philology.  Philology, in this 
instance, will not take us very far, but it will take us somewhere.  Since sincerity does not 
figure in the classical catalogue of the virtues, it comes as no surprise to note that 
‘sincere’ and ‘sincerity’ in the sense that they have in modern English deviate 
semantically from their Latin etymology.  Sincerus, at the classical period and after, 
meant whole, simple, pure, and true in the sense of genuine, accurate or unmixed.  In this 
last sense, it can be said to match the Greek ἁπλοῦς to mean simple, as used by 
Theophrastus in the Characters, as well as ‘unalloyed’, as used to describe materials.  As 
for sinceritas, it was used to refer to physical wholeness, purity or moral integrity.  In 
classical Latin and later, therefore, sincerus and sinceritas refer to the quality possessed 
by what is unmixed or pure.  Although the terms may carry ethical connotations they do 
not as a rule denote the moral quality of veracity.14 
 
Augustine is not a heavy user of either term15.  To sincerus he prefers simplex or 
mundus which in classical Latin mean simple, clean, or elegant.  Occasionally, he uses 
mundicordis, a rare and post-classical adjective, which the venerable Du Cange translates 
in its later mediaeval sense as unica voce.16  To sinceritas, Augustine prefers munditia or 
mundatio both of which he uses in their classical sense of cleanliness or elegance of 
either appearance or language.  Presumably in order to notify his readers that he uses 
these words to refer to the private, as opposed to the public self, he mostly specifies them 
                                                 
14 See The Oxford Latin Dictionary, ed. P.G.W. Glare; C.T. Lewis and C. Short, A Latin Dictionary, and F. 
Gaffiot, Dictionnaire Illustré Latin-Français.  For the meaning of sincerus as simple and pure, see Tacitus’ 
exhortation to his fellow countrymen to be a sincerus et integer ... populus (‘a pure and untainted race’) 
(Historiae, 4.64, transl. C.D. Fisher).  For sincerus in the sense of genuine, see Aulus Gellius’ description 
of books sold as bonae atque sincerae vetustatis libri (‘books good and genuinely old’, Attic Nights, V.4.1, 
my transl.).  For sincerus in the sense of accurate, see Cicero’s description of Thucydides as a rerum 
gestarum pronunciator sincerus (‘a faithful recorder of the past’, Brutus, 83.287, transl. G.L. Hendrikson 
and H.M. Hubbell).   
15 Pace Walker (1978: 492), who writes: ‘Very roughly, Augustine there [De sermone domini in monte] 
sees sinceritas as a matter of purity of heart (munditia cordis), which in turn he interprets as requiring that a 
man should harbor no evil desires’.  As the following sections will show, the matter is considerably more 
complex than Walker suggests.  For a complete list of the occurrences of these and related terms in 
Augustine, see Tombeur (2002). 
16 Du Cange, C., Glossarium Ad Scriptores Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis (1720). s.v. mundicordis (tomus 
iv, p. 545).  
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by cordis.  In Augustine’s usage, therefore, munditia, like mundatio cordis, denotes 
purity of heart.    
 
These notions figure prominently in his De sermone Domini in monte 
(Commentary on the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount), written in 393-94, some three years 
before the Confessions17.  The relevant scriptural lines are Matthew 5.6 (‘Blessed are the 
pure of heart for they shall see God’) and 6.16 (‘… when you fast, do not look gloomy 
like the hypocrites; for they disfigure the face in order to appear to men as fasting etc.’).  
Taking hypocrisy, as characterized by the Apostle, to be the paradigm of impurity of 
heart, Augustine puts a semi-philosophical and mildly Aristotelian gloss on the eighth 
beatitude:   
A cleansing of the heart is, as it were, a cleansing of that eye by which 
God is seen, and the care for keeping it single ought to be great in 
proportion to the dignity of the reality that can be perceived by such an 
eye. (II,1,1, transl. slightly modified)18 
Although Augustine’s reasoning is, in this instance, unhelpfully compressed, its steps are 
easily identifiable: (1) An excessive concern for temporal goods spreads grime into the 
heart; (2) The hypocrite’s lamentable intention of winning men’s praise dominates his 
otherwise commendable intention of obeying God’s law; (3) The co-presence in the 
hypocrite’s mind of two morally discrepant intentions causes division in his soul; (4) Any 
cleansing of the heart is to be reflexive: the sinner himself must eradicate the bad 
intention; (5) Consequent upon this act of self-purification, the sinner is able to ascend to 
the divine, as it is to be found within and beyond the self.   
 
As operative in the text from which this quotation is taken, Augustine’s concept 
of intention is crucial for an appreciation of his anguished and obsessive regard for the 
truth.  Although he does not explicitly distinguish intentions from motives, he can 
nevertheless be said to make an implicit distinction between them in so far as he defines 
intentions as mental acts which are conscious by definition.  Indeed, while motives such 
                                                 
17 As Augustine himself records in Retractationes, I.14-27. 
18 Translations from the De sermone Domini in monte are in D.J. Kavanagh’s translation, with occasional 
slight modifications, which are flagged as such. 
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as envy and resentment may not be conscious, we cannot intend, as Augustine realized, 
without knowing that we intend.  Whenever the mind intends, therefore, it is present to 
itself and, to that extent at least, knows itself.  As defined in 393-94, therefore, 
Augustine’s concept of intention prefigures the theory of the self-transparency of the 
mind that he would later famously develop in the De trinitate.    
   
Augustine exploits what appears to have been for him a straightforward 
conceptual point in two different ways.  In the first place, he contrasts the perspicuity of 
intentions with the uncertainty of their outcomes.  Since the fruition of our goals cannot 
ever be guaranteed, he denied it ethical relevance.  The very existence of this contrast, as 
he construed it, reinforced his anti-consequentialism and led him to affirm that the 
morality of actions should not be assessed by their consequences but solely by the 
intention of the agent.  As he wrote: ‘in all our actions… it is the intention, and not the 
act, that ought to be considered, for the intention is indeed the light within us’ 
(Commentary on the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, II,13,46).  The use of the metaphor of 
light to account for the intentional aspect of actions is highly significant.  We shall return 
to the issue.   
 
 Far bolder is the second thesis that Augustine draws from his conception of 
intention as ‘the light within us’.  To appreciate how bold this second thesis is, let us ask 
him whether he means that intentions are luminous irrespectively of their morality.  Let 
us ask him whether he would countenance the inference that evil intentions, qua 
intentions, are as luminous as good ones.  ‘Yes’, he replies, ‘even a bad intention is a 
light’ (ibid., II,13,46).  In a way, this answer is no more than should have been expected 
since it is consonant with his conception of intention as self-transparent by definition.  
Yet, for all that, it is a little surprising to see the bishop of Hippo use the metaphor of 
light to describe evil in the soul.  Presumably to ease the paradox, he unobtrusively 
smuggles in an extra criterion - a moral criterion - to complement what had initially been 
presented as a straightforward conceptual point.  Although all intentions, qua such, are 
light, he writes, the light of evil intentions is dimmed by the concomitant presence in the 
mind of a desire for ‘the temporal things of earth’: 
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… that same light is darkness when the intention is not a single intention 
(simplex intentio) directed toward things of the upper world, but is 
deflected toward the things beneath; it is as though it were causing an 
eclipse when the heart is twofold (duplici corde) (ibid., II,13,46, transl. 
slightly modified). 
When read side by side with the scriptural texts on which they are meant as a gloss, these 
lines begin to yield Augustine’s concept of insincerity.  In his viewpoint, the intention of 
the hypocrite is both light and dark.  To the extent that the hypocrite’s attempt to appear 
other than he is can properly be described as deliberate and purposeful, he knows his own 
mind.  His cynicism is proof of his self-knowledge.  Yet, to the extent that the hypocrite 
is driven by the desire for the temporal good of human praise, he invites darkness into his 
soul.  He allows the light within to be dimmed by alien shadowy elements.   
 
 At this point, let us pause briefly and ponder the nature of the contrast between 
light and darkness that Augustine uses to describe evil-intentioned behavior in general, 
and hypocrisy in particular.  On the surface, his meaning is plain.  The notion of divided 
heart (duplex cor) readily accounts for the two paradigms of hypocrisy in our later 
literary heritage, Molière’s Tartuffe and Dickens’ Uriah Heep.  Tartuffe puts on a 
pretense of piety in order to win Orgon’s trust, but he does so with the ultimate purpose 
of seducing Orgon’s wife, Elmire.  So doing, he bears out La Rochefoucauld’s famous 
maxim that ‘hypocrisy is a homage that vice renders to virtue’19.  As for Uriah Heep’s 
strategy, it, too, consists in faking a virtue, namely humility, in order ultimately to secure 
the wealth and social status that he craves.  Both Tartuffe and Uriah Heep deliberately 
and purposefully simulate the good in order to gain worldly advantages.  They both 
concurrently fulfill two separate intentions and serve two different masters.  Their heart, 
which ought to be pure and simple, is divided.  They are doubly insincere for they are 
insincere in both senses of the word.  As Augustine writes: 
... whenever a man simulates goodness, he has a divided heart.  Therefore, 
no one has a single heart - and this is the same as a clean heart - unless he 
                                                 
19 ‘L’hypocrisie est un hommage que le vice rend à la vertu’, La Rochefoucauld, Réflexions ou Sentences et 
Maximes Morales,  CCXVIII, Paris, Hachette, 1868 (1st ed. 1665). 
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rises above human praise while he is living an upright life, that is to say, 
unless his thoughts and his efforts to please are directed solely toward Him 
who alone is the discerner of conscience. (ibid., II,1,1)     
 
Augustine’s purpose in drawing a contrast between the light of righteousness and 
the darkness of temporal cares is not, however, solely to describe the mental set up of 
hypocrites and other sinners.  It is also, more importantly, to offer a philosophical 
account of it.  To this account, we now turn.   
 
 
VI 
 
 In the Cassiciacum dialogues, particularly the Soliloquia and the De magistro, 
Augustine begins to outline the rationalist epistemology in which his commitment to the 
ideal of sincerity is ultimately to be traced.  Three tenets of this epistemology are of 
especial relevance to our issue.  Augustine holds, firstly, that it is in the nature of the 
mind to be innately furnished with abstract concepts, a priori principles and eternal truths, 
all of which he classifies under the umbrella title of ‘intelligibles’.  He thinks, secondly, 
that, in certain conditions, the mind can take direct cognizance of its own contents by 
consulting ‘the inner truth by means of reason’ (De magistro, XII.39, tr. P. King).  He 
believes, thirdly, as intimated earlier, that the mind enjoys automatic and privileged 
access to its own operations.  The first two tenets are combined in the account of the 
cognition of intelligibles that Augustine gives in that dialogue:  
When we deal with things that we perceive by the mind, that is, namely by 
the intellect and reason, we are speaking of things that we look upon 
immediately in the inner light of Truth, in virtue of which the so-called 
inner man is illuminated and rejoices. (XII.40, transl. P. King)    
Augustine emphasizes the inwardness and incorporeal nature of intelligibles by calling 
them ‘spiritual’, in contrast with sense impressions, which he likes to describe as ‘carnal’ 
(ibid.).  Later on, in the Confessions, his examples of intelligibles will turn out to be 
pretty standard: the ‘truths and laws of mathematics and mensuration’, the ‘principle of 
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number’, as well as the norms presupposed in evaluative concepts such as happiness. 
(X.9, 16-17)  
 
The fact that all three epistemological tenets are grounded in his theory of divine 
illumination accounts for Augustine’s pervasive use of the metaphor of light in discussing 
epistemological issues.  This metaphor is worked very hard in Augustine’s writings, 
being pressed into service to describe all possible objects of direct intellectual 
apprehension, from the most straightforward of intentions to the Creator.  For Augustine, 
as will be recalled, the source of light - indeed sometimes the light itself - is God.  In the 
same way as we see earthly things courtesy of the sun, he Platonically holds, we 
apprehend ‘the most certain truths which are arrived at by the sciences’ (Soliloquia, I.12, 
transl. G. Watson) thanks to the illumination of our mind by the divine guarantor of truth.  
In the words of Reason, as she is personified in the Soliloquia: ‘… it is God Himself who 
illuminates, and I myself, the Reason, am to minds what the sight is to eyes’ (ibid.)  
Hence, we may infer, when the human mind apprehends itself through its conscious 
operations, it does so courtesy of divine illumination.  When it is so illuminated and 
further aided by virtue, Reason can even display God to our mind (ibid.).  Although 
Augustine holds that the human mind has been created so as to be naturally equipped for 
the discovery and the enjoyment of eternal truths, he consistently teaches that it cannot 
actively realize these capabilities without divine assistance.  As time went by, Augustine 
would stress the difficulties in the path of contemplation more and more.  In a relatively 
late work, the De genesi ad litteram (written from ca 401 to 414), he expressed most 
clearly the paradox that is central to his theological epistemology: God is both present in 
the soul and above it.  Fully exploiting the rich potential of his favourite metaphor while 
taking care to prevent any possible misunderstanding of it, Augustine urges his readers to 
reach out to the divine within.  Let us, he writes, distinguish between the objects of 
intellectual vision and the light that makes it possible and understand that: 
…the light itself is something else [than the objects of intellectual vision], 
the light by which the soul is enlightened in order truly to understand and 
observe all things either in itself or in this light.  For this light is now God 
himself, while the soul is a creature, even though a rational and intelligent 
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one made to his image.  So when it strives to gaze upon that light, it blinks 
and shivers in its weakness, and quite simply lacks the power to do so.  
Yet that light is what enables it to understand whatever is within the range 
of its power.  When therefore the mind is snatched up there, and being 
withdrawn from the senses of the flesh, is set more firmly in the presence 
of that vision, not spatially but in its own kind of way, it also sees above 
itself the one by whose aid it also is enabled to see whatever it can see in 
itself by intellectual understanding (XII,31,59, transl. E. Hill).   
As Gareth Matthews well said: ‘Augustine combines the idea of God as the source of 
epistemic illumination with the idea of God as a blinding light which, even as it enables 
us to bring other things into focus, cannot be brought into focus itself’20.   
 
The above passage, in which a distinct Plotinian echo can be heard, describes an 
intellectual and spiritual ascent.  As a matter of definition, ascents may, but need not, 
culminate.  Those who undertake a journey to the interior of the soul may, or may not, 
succeed in ‘snatching themselves up’, as the translation quoted above has it.  At Ostia, 
Augustine undoubtedly thought that he had had such a vision, which, interestingly 
enough, he characterised as ‘a moment of knowledge’ (momentum intelligentiae, Conf. 
IX. 25)21.  Earlier on, while still at Milan, his discovery of a Latin translation of the books 
of the Platonists had been, from his own account, followed by a mystical experience 
which he described in terms similar to those he would later to use in the De genesi ad 
litteram:    
These books served to remind me to return to my own self.  Under your 
guidance I entered into the depths of my soul, and this I was able to do 
because your aid befriended me.  I entered, and with the eye of my soul, 
such as it was, I saw the Light that never changes casting its ray over the 
same eye of my soul, over my mind.  It was not the common light of 
day…. It shone above my mind … it was itself the Light that made me … 
(Conf. VII,10.16, trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin, my italics) 
                                                 
20 G. Matthews (2001: 183). 
21 See also Soliloquia I.12: ‘to see God is to understand God’. 
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From the Soliloquia to the De genesi ad litteram, via the De magistro, the De 
libero arbitrio and the Confessions, as can be seen, Augustine’s teaching is that the 
human mind (or soul) can reach out to the divine light.  But if Augustine believes that the 
self can reach beyond itself and that the soul can come within reach of the ultimate 
vision, he does not think that it can do so easily or comfortably.  Demanding intellectual 
and moral conditions are set in their path.  Although the two sets of conditions overlap in 
Augustine’s presentation, I shall, for clarity’s sake, consider them separately.   
 
The intellectual conditions require of the mind that it concentrate its attention on 
objects of a high ontological dignity, i.e. incorporeal objects or intelligibles, which can be 
directly apprehended by the mind without the mediation of the senses.22  In Augustine’s 
outlook, the elevation of the mind from the ‘carnal’ to the ‘spiritual’ takes the form of a 
mental ascent such as his own, as famously described in book X of the Confessions.  The 
ascent proceeds by stages from the reception of the data of sense to the formation of 
images by the imagination, to the exploration of memory, to the direct apprehension by 
the mind of realities innately lodged in it, and, finally, to the realization that God is 
within the mind of the seeker.23  Or, as he put it in one of his most famous apostrophes to 
the Deity: tu autem eras interior intimo meo, et superior summo meo (‘You were deeper 
within than my own deepest self, and higher than my own highest self’’, III, 6.1124)      
 
Yet, as mentioned above, to ascend is not a sufficient condition for reaching the 
summit.  To look is but one of the prerequisites for seeing.  As the following passage 
from the Soliloquia shows, Augustine was keenly aware of this fact:  
… to have eyes is not the same thing as to look at something, and to look 
at something is not the same thing as to see.  So the soul must have three 
qualifications: it must have eyes which it can already use effectively, it 
must look, and it must see.  ‘Healthy eyes’ means a mind which is free 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Confessions, X. 12,19. 
23 Confessions, X. 6,8 to 25,36. 
24 It gives me great pleasure, in a volume that celebrates Denis O’Brien’s scholarly achievements, to quote 
this famous line in his own felicitous rendering (1968). 
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from all stain of the body, that is, far removed and cleansed from all 
longings for mortal things. (I.12, transl. G. Watson) 
Virtue, the health of the soul, as Augustine tells us in this passage, can alone initiate and 
sustain the looking.  ‘Virtue’ is here to be taken as a class name including both the 
theological and the moral virtues.  Let us briefly take those in turn.  Faith inspires the 
mind to enquire and gives the seeker confidence that the divine vision will satisfy his 
longing and make him blessed.  Hope sustains his expectation of enjoying this vision.  As 
for charity, it causes him actively to love the object of his longing, and thereby ensures 
that he will not wish to turn from the looking.   
 
As Augustine knew well, however, the theological virtues cannot be practiced in 
the absence of moral virtue.  More specifically, he knew that the exercise of faith, hope 
and charity, which enable the believer to seek spiritual sustenance over all others, is 
conditional upon the overcoming of superfluous bodily wants.  Uppermost in Augustine’s 
mind, therefore, at this stage of his argument, are those among the moral virtues which 
silence what he calls the concupiscence of the flesh.  As he makes clear in book X of the 
Confessions, Augustine takes a very broad interpretation of the concupiscence of the 
flesh.  Under this heading, he includes not only non procreative sex and other corporeal 
delights, but also a number of other interests which would not ordinarily be so classified, 
such as the desire for worldly success and the temptation to court human affection.  All of 
these, he holds, channel our attention into the wrong direction, that is aside and outwards, 
and are therefore liable ultimately to debilitate the soul.   
 
A debilitated soul is one whose obsessive care for the body has rendered 
incapable of turning inwards and beholding the entities of reason that, in Augustine’s 
outlook, it holds within itself.  Worse even, a debilitated soul is one that shuts out the 
divine illumination that would otherwise empower it to see ‘above itself’ and find its 
Beatitude.  Of this shutting out of the light, Augustine held insincerity to be the first and 
paradigmatic manifestation.  In the same way as Adam and Eve covered their body with 
leaves, he writes in the De trinitate, they wove together ‘good words without the fruit of 
good works so as, while living wickedly, to cover their disgrace… by speaking well.’ (X. 
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8. 13)  By this Augustine means that, after the fall, Adam and Eve misused their rational 
and spiritual principle by subordinating it to temporal concerns.  So doing, they 
adulterated it and weakened its capacity for beholding God’s truth.  In the process, the 
inner self became Janus-like, turned at one and the same time to heaven and to earth.  Its 
regard for God’s law became contaminated by care for temporal things.  Instead of being 
wholehearted and pure, it became insincere because impure.  As Augustine was at pains 
to stress in part III of the De libero arbitrio, to attend to earthly matters in preference to 
spiritual concerns is at one and the same time an error of judgment and a sin.  The 
(culpable) error of judgment consists in mistaking the dross of the world of sense for the 
gold of intelligible reality.  The sin is rooted in the failure of the soul to educate itself and 
in the turning of the will from immutable to transitory goods.  Both the error and the sin 
incapacitate the mind by shutting out the source of its illumination.  The insincere, the 
impure of heart will not see God. 
 
 
VII 
 
Augustine’s rationalist epistemology supports his commitment to introspection.  
Since the soul holds within itself eternal truths and intelligible realities, since God is the 
illuminating agency through which we are empowered to take cognizance of the most 
estimable epistemic objects, it follows that the soul that would know God must know 
itself.  Or, in an alternative interpretation of Augustine’s thesis, in knowing God, the soul 
may know itself.  The interchangeability, in this instance, of God and the soul as 
epistemic objects accounts for the minimalist and confusing syntax of the prayer which 
opens the second book of the Soliloquia: Noverim me, noverim te (‘May I come to know 
myself and come to know You’).25   
 
                                                 
25 See also the opening words of Confessions X: ‘Cognoscam te, cognitor meus, cognoscam, sicut et 
cognitus sum.’ (‘Let me know you, O you who know me; then shall I know even as I am known’, transl. M. 
Boulding).  For a skilful unraveling of the possible meanings of the Soliloquia prayer, see G. Verbeke 
(1954), to whom I am here indebted.  
 21
Within the framework of Augustine’s theological epistemology, self-scrutiny, 
therefore, becomes an intellectual as well as a religious duty.  In Sermon 72 (On 
Almsgiving), a text that deserves to be better known, he urges this duty upon us:  
... there is nothing which anyone ought to consider more important than to 
fix his attention on himself, to learn his own case, to examine himself, to 
scrutinize himself, to search into himself, to discover himself…(transl. D. 
J. Kavanagh) 
 
As we know, self-scrutiny is not a duty that Augustine was ever reluctant to 
discharge.  To discharge it, he found a way that was strikingly innovative: he used a form 
of introspection.26  Admittedly, self-scrutiny was not entirely unheard of in antiquity, but 
it took a different form from the one Augustine relied upon, consisting of either an 
examination of conscience or a scrutiny by the mind of its own powers.  Although the 
first form was rare, it was not totally unknown.  The Pythagoreans were thought to have 
advocated it.  Seneca recommends practicing it daily27.  Plotinus advocates it in a famous 
and much loved passage.28  While there is no reason to doubt that these philosophers 
acted upon their own advice, it should be noted that that they did not feel incumbent upon 
themselves to share the fruit of their search with their readers.  Augustine, by contrast, 
did. 
 
  Far more common in Antiquity was the epistemologically motivated exploration 
of the mind by itself.  Of this kind of self-scrutiny, Augustine had several models to 
choose from, all couched in abstract and impersonal terms.  Take for example Plotinus, 
                                                 
26 For a description of the two different forms of introspection at work in Augustine’s writings, see Stern-
Gillet (2006).  
27 In Seneca’s description, the Stoic Q. Sextius ‘at the end of the day, after retiring for his nightly rest, 
would put these questions to his soul: “What bad habit have you cured to-day?”, “What fault have you 
resisted?”, “In what respect are your better?” … Can anything be more excellent than this practice of 
thoroughly sifting the whole day?’ (De Ira, III.36.1-2, transl. J.W. Basore).  This passage is often taken to 
provide evidence of Seneca’s Pythagorean sympathies, as shown in Griffin (1976: 37-39).  On self-scrutiny 
in pre-Christian antiquity, see W. Jaeger (1959). 
28 ‘Go back into yourself and look; and if you do not yet see yourself as beautiful, then, just as someone 
making a statue which has to be beautiful cuts away here and polishes there and makes one part smooth and 
clears another till he has given his statue a beautiful face, so you too must cut away excess and straighten 
the crooked and clear the dark and make it bright, and never stop “working on your statue”’, Ennead I.6 [1] 
9. 7-13, transl. A.H. Armstrong. 
 22
chief among those platonici to whom Augustine owed so much.  When, in the fourth 
Ennead, Plotinus expresses the view that the best way to obey the Apollinian command 
to know oneself is ‘to seek the real nature of that which seeks’ (IV.3 [27].1. 11, transl. 
A.H. Armstrong), he has in mind a highly theoretical and abstract inquiry by the soul into 
its own origin, the manner of its descent into body as well as the nature and extent of its 
own cognitive powers.  Admittedly, when, in the fifth Ennead (V.1 [10]. 12. 12-20), 
Plotinus advises us to turn our attention inwards, he seeks to motivate us to undertake a 
movement of conversion and a spiritual ascent.  But the ascent, as he conceives it, 
consists in a dispassionate metaphysical meditation, a meditation that would not differ in 
essentials from one seeker to another.  It does not require that the seeker engage in a 
process of retrospection and pore over past mistakes and misdeeds.  Yet this is precisely 
what Augustine did.   
 
The virtues required of these two types of conversion are of a different order.  A 
Plotinian conversion requires, in the main although not exclusively, the possession of 
intellectual virtues such as a capacity for rational thought, discernment and intellectual 
integrity.  By contrast, an Augustinian conversion requires, in the main although not 
exclusively, the possession of moral virtues.  Chief among those is sincerity in the first of 
the two senses distinguished earlier, viz. being truthful about oneself.    
 
The ideal of truthfulness that inspired Augustine’s Confessions stood to be 
jeopardized by three common human tendencies: lying to oneself, lying to others, and 
using the truth as a means to win men’s praise.  Of these, the first, self-deception, is the 
most invidious.  The kind of journey to the interior of the soul that Augustine undertook 
was a journey into the (almost) unknown.  There were but few relevant public facts and 
events that he needed to record ‘exactly as they were’29.  Like all historians, he had to 
search for what he would disclose.  Unlike most historians, he was his own archives.  
This was especially so since Augustine had converted to a religion in which the spirit of 
the law takes precedence over its letter.  Speech, therefore, became for him the 
                                                 
29 This, of course, is an allusion to Ranke’s famous ideal of historical objectivity: ‘wie es eigentlich 
gewesen ist’. 
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performance of truth or, in his striking formulation, a way of ‘making (facere) truth’.  As 
a result, no one, save God, could assess the veracity of his narrative.  But God’s 
omniscience makes lying futile.  And so, why write, after all?  Why make one’s 
confession ‘in the face of this congregation’?   
 
The Bishop of Hippo was ever conscious of his pastoral responsibilities, and there 
is no doubt, therefore, that he intended his Confessions to serve a didactic purpose.  The 
description of his journey to faith was for him a means not only of purifying his own 
heart but also of educating his brothers and sisters in Adam in the mysterious ways of 
God’s grace.30  The Confessions are an invitation to his readers, in their turn, to recall 
their own past sins and failings so that they, too, might come within reach of the 
immutable divine being who is above, and yet within, their own individual self.  Without 
sincerity, in both senses of the word distinguished in section II above, such an endeavour 
would be doomed to failure.  A confession must be sincere in the sense of being an 
accurate record of one’s past self.  But it must also be sincere in the sense of being solely 
motivated by the aspiration that initiated it, which in Augustine’s case was to reach out to 
the divine.  Vanity, smugness or the desire for self-aggrandizement must not enter into 
the motivation of one who confesses in the hope of finding God. 31 
 
And so it was that public self-disclosure became for Augustine a pressing and 
important duty.  And so it was that, thanks to him, sincerity became the prime moral 
excellence of the autobiographical, confessional, discourse.  And so it was that, pace 
Lionel Trilling, long before the Renaissance, sincerity became a moral virtue.32 
 
                                                 
30 To borrow from G. Madec: ‘… ce moi, pêcheur et converti, s’il est bien le moi singulier d’Augustin, est 
aussi celui de tout fils d’Adam’, ‘”In te supra me”.  Le sujet dans les Confessions de saint Augustin’, Revue 
de l’Institut Catholique de Paris, 28 (1988 :52).  See, too, pp. 52-54. 
31 To what extent Augustine himself succeeded in overcoming these tendencies is a matter for the 
biographer, not for a theoretical investigation such as the present one.  For an attempt to confront the reality 
of Augustine’s confessional practice with his theory of self-disclosure, see O’Donnell (2005).      
32 This article is an expanded version of the text of the Augustinian Lecture, originally delivered in April 
2004 at the University of Villanova, where I then taught, and subsequently read at the Catholic University 
of Lublin upon the invitation of Professor Agnieszka Kijewska.  In both cases I much benefited from the 
discussion that ensued.  In addition, I should like to thank most warmly the friends and colleagues who 
took the trouble to discuss with me various aspects of the thesis of this paper: Helen Lang, Goulven Madec 
and Denis O’Brien.   
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